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STATE OF UTAH, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DONALD L. MALMROSE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 17661 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal from the Honorable Calvin Gould's 
denial of appellant's motion for a new trial. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was convicted by a jury of forcible 
sexual abuse. He was sentenced to the Utah State Prison. 
A motion for new trial was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant requests this Court to reverse the 
conviction and grant a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 16, 198'.J, Brooke Williams was sexually 
assaulted while jogging on a running course at Weber 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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State College. She reported the assault to Weber State 
police and gave a description of her assailant. On 
April 17, 1980, Mrs. Williams was shown a group of muq 
shots in an attempt to identify her assailant. From 
these pictures she picked out four individuals she 
thought resembled him. (Suppression Hearing 9) The 
mug shots were returned to the Ogden City Police 
Department without a record being kept. (T 118) On 
July 1, 1980, the complaining witness was shown seven 
drivers license photos which she mistakenly thouaht 
contained the same four pictures as before. She 
narrowed these to two possible suspects. (Suppression 
Hearing lJ) While reviewing this group of pictures, 
Mrs. Williams was told by the police that none of the 
men were "nice guys". (Suppression Hearing 12, 31) She 
requested a recent photograph of one of these men ~nd 
the next day the police showed her a Mound Fort Junior 
High school yearbook open to a page where the defendant 
was pictured alone with the basketball team. (T 8 3, 84) 
After looking at the yearbook photograph, she was 
informed that defendant had committed a sex offense in 
California. (Suppression Hearing 24) An identification 
was obtained. 
On September 9, 1980, the cowplaining witness 
picked the defendant out of a lineuo at the ?Olice 
station and he was arrested. The lineuo was eventually 
-2-
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suppressed by Judge John F. Wahlquist because it was 
conducted in violation of State statute. (Suopression 
Hearing 4 3) 
The first photograph display did not contain a 
picture of the defendant. (T 166) Throughout the 
proceedings, Mrs. Williams maintained that she picked 
out the defendant from"the first group of mug shots· 
on April 17, 1980. (Suppression Hearing 10) The 
police officers said she was not shown a picture of 
the defendant until July 1, 1980. (T 118) 
Defendant's trial commenced February 9, 1981 
on the charge of forcible sexual abuse, a third-degree 
felony. During the voir dire of the jury, prospective 
juror Hunter made the following statements: 
"I have a son who is a principal in an 
elementary school. It might be better 
if I didn't listen to this." (T 11) 
Speaking of her acquaintance with 
George Handy, a State's witness, she 
said: "Hy acquaintance is casual. 
I would believe what he said, yes". 
(T 13) 
When the Court asked her whether she 
would subject George Handy to the same 
scrutiny as other witnesses, her answer 
was "probably". (T 14) 
"I might be prejudice in this way, that 
I think where schools are involved 
there shouldn't be any question involved 
about teacher propriety." (T 29) 
When asked whether there was any reason 
any of the jurors would not want to hear 
the case, she said: "I would prefer not 
to". (T 31) 
-3-
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Prospective juror Widdison was asked whether 
he had made up his mind based upon what he had read 
in the newspaper. He replied: "Not totally. I'm 
sure it's bias". (T 29) When questioned further 
about his ability to be fair, he only said: "I 
believe I could". When asked if he would be inclined 
to give a speedy decision because of his pending 
vacation, he answered "probably". (T 30) 
The Court denied defendant's challenge for 
cause on both of these jurors. (T 33) Defendant used 
a peremptory challenge to eliminate prospective juror 
Hunter. (R 583) Juror Widdison was selected to try 
the case. (R 583) 
Other jurors selected to try the case gave 
troublesome responses during the voir dire. Juror Austin 
said she has occasionally been assaulted by her husband, 
and further indicated she might have problems with a 
younger lady in a sexual assault case because of her own 
family difficulties. (T 26, 27, 31) 
Juror Stockwell indicated his brother-in-law 
was on the Highway Patrol and his daughter was attending 
Weber State College. (T 17) 
Juror Wood lived in the same neighborhood and 
attends the same church ward as prosecutor 
Michael Glasmann. When asked if it would make any 
difference, he responded: "I could probably assure 
-4-
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them that it wouldn't". (emphasis supplied) (T 10) 
The Court then suggested that defense counsel might 
want to pursue this line of questioning; Defense 
counsel failed to do so. Juror Wood also said he 
knew James Gaskill, George Handy and Brian Stromberg 
who were prospective State. witnesses. None of these 
potential problem areas were pursued by Court or 
counsel. 
Juror Poulter admitted to a hearing problem. 
She said she could hear the prosecutor, but sometimes 
9oulc;ln' t hear the others which apparently. included 
the Court and defense counseL .. " (T 2 3) When she was 
asked by the Court if she had any immediate family in 
police .. work, her response was: "Yes, he has one 
daughter teaching here -- well, here in Ogden .. (T 19) 
It was apparent from the response that she did not 
hear the Judg19' s ,question. Jurors. Stockwell, . Wood 
and Poulter were all selected to try the case. (R 583) 
After the jury.was selected, the Court read 
instructions 1 through 10 which included the 
instructions on the presumption of innocence and 
credibility of witnesses. (T 35, 506) These 
instructions were not given again at the conclusion 
of the three-day trial. 
During defense counsel's opening statement, 
he said: 
-5-
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"I would just like to bring out that the 
only reason that Mr. Malmrose is before 
you is through a series of coincidences. 
A coincidence where his car was parked 
allowed the police to take his license 
number. The license number in turn was 
pulled because his car was parked in an 
area where they had some problems with 
men exposing themselves." (T 44) 
Evidence was not introduced to support this allegation. 
During the trial, James Gaskill testified about 
conducting certain laboratory tests. The substance of 
the testimony was that the blood type obtained from 
defendant's saliva sample matched the blood type in 
the assailant's semen found on the body of the 
complaining witness. Also, both specimens contained 
the H antigen which shows they are secretors. His 
written report was offered and admitted into evidence. 
(T 150) 
Dr. David Dodd, a Ph.D. psychologist, preferred 
expert testimony on behalf of defendant on the many 
problems and misconceptions involved in evaluating the 
accuracy of eyewitness identifications. Dr. Dodd 
maintained that education, special training, and 
intelligence are not meaningful factors in assessing 
the accuracy of such an identification. The prosecutor 
went into great detail establishing the educational 
background, special training and supposed high 
intelligence of the complaining witness. The purpose 
of this testimony was to infer that she possessed a 
-6-
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superior ability to perceive and accurately recall. 
The Court refused to allow Dr. Dodd to testify to 
the j ury . ( T l 7 0 ) 
Prior to the trial, defendant filed his Notice 
of Alibi as required by statute. The.State called 
four rebuttal witnesses to defendant's alibi. At 
no time did the prosecutor file. a reciprocal Notice 
of Alibi as required by statute. 
During the cross-eximination of defendant, the .. 
prosecutor asked: 
"Do you recall·making the statement. to 
them (the police), I'm a voyeur, but I 
wouldn't assault anyone." (T 358) 
A timely objection was made and the Court ruled in 
defendant's favDr, but denied a request for a 
cautionary instruction. (T 363) 
One of~ the State's rebuttal. witnesses was 
Mark Eubank. He testified concerning the weather on 
April 16, 1980 which was brought into issue duri~g 
the presentation of defendant's alibi. His entire 
presentation was from the reports of_ other people in 
the Ogden area. This is mentioned because the defendant 
argues herein that the presentation was hearsay. 
Florence Stowe was initially called by the 
defendant. She testified that defendant was at work 
at Mound Fort Junior High school on April 16, 1980, 
and that she could remember the day because she had 
-7-
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ordered some cream pies for a church meeting that 
night and recorded this fact in a personal journal. 
The prosecutor recalled Mrs. Stowe in rebuttal and 
asked her to read the dates of the last two entries 
in her journal which were March 30, 1980 and 
April 26, 1980. (T 471) Mr. Glasmann asked no 
further questions and created the imoression that 
she was mistaken about the date in her earlier 
testimony. Mrs. Stowe's journal entry on 
April 26, 1980 specifically referred to the date 
of the church function as April 16, 1980. (R 641) 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on 
February 11, 1981 after three days of trial. 
On February 25, 1981, the Court sentenced the 
defendant to the Utah State Prison. A motion for new 
trial was timely filed by new counsel for the 
defendant. The motion was denied by the Court on 
April 3, 1981. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
AS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Many of the issues raised in this appeal were 
not properly preserved by defense counsel at trial. 
As subsequent matters are discussed in this Brief, 
-8-
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that fact will be noted, but further authority will 
not be cited except as set forth in this Point. 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution provides: 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right. 
to have the assistance of counsel 
for his defense." 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State 
Constitution similarly provides: 
"In criminal prosecutions, the 
ace.used· shall have the right to 
appeal and def end in person and 
by counsel. " 
As a general rule, a judgment o£. conviction 
will not be invalidated because of inexperience or · 
unskillfulness on the part of defense counsel or 
because of error in judgment on his part. 
In Herring v. Estelle~ 491 F. 2d 125 (5th 
Cir. 1974.), the Court held that the governing standard 
should be "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel, 
The. Sixth Circuit has ·adopted the following standard: 
"The assistance of counsel required 
under the Sixth.Amendment is counsel 
reasonably likely to render effective 
assistance." Beasley v. United States·, 
491 F. 2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974) 
In United States v. Bosch, 584 F. 2d 113 (1st 
Cir. 1978), a narcotics trial, defense counsel 
introduced into evidence a pre~trial motion for 
..reduction of bail. .The motion disclosed defendant's 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
two other narcotics convictions. It was offered 
to prove that defendant had been in court on the 
date it was filed; however, defense counsel did 
not attempt to delete the reference to his client's 
prior crimes. During deliberation, the jury informed 
the trial Judge that the fact of defendant's prior 
convictions had influenced its opinion of his 
character. Counsel did not request a limiting 
instruction or demand a mistrial. Defendant was 
convicted. On appeal, the Bosch Court reversed and 
adopted the "reasonably competent assistance 
standard". The Court held that the quality of 
defense counsel's representations must be within 
the range of competence expected of attorneys in 
criminal cases. The standard in Utah was adopted in 
State v. McNichol, 554 P. 2d 203 (1976). 
In footnote five of State v. Gray, 601 P. 2d 
918 (1979), the Court stated: 
"We do not mean· to be understood as 
saying that a defendant can only succeed 
in showing that he was deprived of 
counsel by showing that his attorney's 
failures reduced his trial to "a farce 
or a mockery of justice". We agree with 
the dissent that the standard should be 
as stated in State v. McNichol. 
that the righ~counsel "is not 
satisfied by a sham or pretense" of an 
attorney, but an accused is "entitled 
to the assistance of a competent member 
of the Bar who shows a willingness to 
identify himself with the interests of 
the accused and present such defenses as 
are available." 
-10-
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In State v. Smith, 621 P. 2d 697 (1980), this 
Court considered whether the lack of fair assistance 
of counsel could be treated as harmless error. The 
Court said: 
"But the assistance of counsel is among 
those constitutional rights so basic to 
a fair trial that their infraction can 
never be treated as harmless error." 
At page 699. 
It is submitted that the errors of defendant's 
counsel at trial went beyond errors of judgment or 
mistake of tactics and fell below the threshold of 
competence expected of lawyers in criminal trials. 
POINT TWO 
DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE OF JURORS HUNTER AND 
WIDDISON SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUSTAINED. 
During the jury voir dire, prospective jurors 
Hunter and Widdison each expressed a state of mind 
which indicated they could not act impartially if 
selected. 
Juror Hunter made the following statements: 
"I have a son who is a principal in an 
elementary school. It might be better 
if I didn't listen to this." (T 11) 
Speaking of her acquaintance with 
George Handy, a State's witness, she 
said: "My acquaintance is casual. 
I would believe what he said, yes". 
(T 13) 
When the Court asked her whether she 
would subject George Handy to the same 
scrutiny as other witnesses, her answer 
was "probably". (T 14) 
-11-
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"I might be prejudice in this way, that 
I think where schools are involved 
there shouldn't be any question involved 
about teacher propriety." (T 29) 
When asked whether there was any reason 
any of the jurors would not want to hear 
the case, she said: "I would prefer not 
to". (T 31) 
Juror Widdison was asked whether he had made 
up his mind based upon what he had read in the 
newspaper. He replied: "Not totally. I'm sure it's 
bias". (T 29) When questioned further about his 
ability to be fair, Mr. Widdison only said: "I 
believe I could". When asked if he would be inclined 
to give a speedy decision because of his pending 
vacation, he answered: "probably". (T 30) It should 
be noted that Mr. Widdison's vacation was scheduled 
to start before the trial actually ended. (T 24) 
Defense counsel challenged both jurors for cause. 
The Court denied the challenge. (T 33) Defendant used a 
peremptory challenge to eliminate Mrs. Hunter. (R 583) 
Mr. Widdison was selected and tried the case. (R 583) 
Rule 19(14), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
allows a challenge for cause provided: 
"[t]hat a state of mind exists on the 
part of the juror with reference to 
the cause, or to either party, which 
will prevent him from acting impartially 
and without prejudice to substantial 
rights of the party challenging. 
In State v. Brooks, 563 P. 2d 799 (1977), the 
-12-
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Utah Supreme Court held it was an abuse of discretion 
for the trial court to deny defense counsel challenge 
for cause when the record indicated a relationship of 
affection, respect, or esteem for some of the State's 
witnesses. The Court went on to say that even though 
the potential jurors stated they would set aside these 
relationships and decide the case without bias, it 
would run counter to human nature not to believe those 
personal associations would influence their decisions. 
Jenkins v. Parrish, No. 15905, filed 
March 13, 1981, considered the trial Court's refusal 
to remove a juror for cause who indicated she would 
give more weight to the testimony of a doctor simply 
because he was a doctor. Upon further questioning by 
the Court, the juror conceded that if the doctor's 
testimony was not in accord with the other evidence, 
she would accept the other evidence. 
said: 
In granting a new trial, the Utah Supreme Court 
"Although Mrs. Eddins expressed a desire 
and ability to remain fair and impartial 
once all the evidence was presented, her 
statements do not alter the fact that she 
indicated that her background would cause 
her to place greater credence in a doctor's 
testimony simply because of his status as a 
doctor. A statement made by a juror that 
she intends to be fair and impartial loses 
much of its meaning in light of other 
testimony and facts which suggest a bias." 
It is submitted that jurors Hunter and Widdison 
-13-
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indicated a state of mind that would prevent them 
from acting impartially. Despite what curative 
questions might· have subsequently been asked by the 
Court, it "would run counter to human nature" 
(Brooks, supra) not to believe that their expressed 
bias would influence their decision. 
POINT THREE 
THE ENTIRE JURY VOIR DIRE BY THE COURT AND DEFENSE 
COUNSEL WAS INADEQUATE. 
Many areas of potential bias and competency 
were inadequately explored by the Court or counsel. 
Juror Austin said that on occasion she had -
been assaulted by her husband, .,and further indicated 
she might have problems with a younger lady in a 
sexual assault case because of.her own family 
difficulties. (Ti26, 27, 31) 
Juror Stockwell's brother-in-law was on the 
Highway Patrol and his daughter was attending Weber 
State College. (T 17) 
Juror Wood lived in the same neighborhood and 
attends the same church ward as prosecutor 
Michael Glasmann. When asked if it would make any 
difference, he responded: "I would probably assure 
them that it wouldn't"·, (emphasis supplied) (T 10) ·· 
The CourL then suggested that defense counsel might' 
want. to pursue this line of questioning. Defense 
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counsel failed to do so. Juror Wood also said he 
knew James Gaskill, George Handy and Brian Stromberg 
who were prospective State witnesses. There was no 
follow-up concerning the nature of these 
relationships. (T 13) 
Juror Poulter admitted to a hearing problem. 
She said she could hear . .t.ha prosecutor, but sometimes 
couldn't hear the others which apparently included 
the Court and defense counsel. (T 23) This hearing 
problem was made apparent when the Court asked her 
if any of her immediate family were in police work. 
Her answer was not at all responsive to this question 
which shows she could not hear the proceedings. (T 19) 
Jurors Stockwell, Wood and Poulter were selected to 
try the case. (R 583) 
POINT FOUR 
UNNECESSARY PREJUDICIAL SUGGESTION ABOUT DEFENDANT 
TOOK PLACE DURING DEFENSE COUNSEL'S OPENING STATEMENT. 
During defense'counsel's opening statement, 
he said: 
"I would just like to bring out that the 
only reason that Mr. Malmrose is before 
you is through a series of coincidences. 
A coincidence where his car was parked 
allowed the police to take his license 
number. The license number in turn was 
pulled because his car was parked in an 
area where they had some problems with 
men exposing themselves." 
Evidence was not introduced to support this statement. 
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It is obvious the State could not have properly 
introduced such evidence. It's possible that it 
might be considered a tactical error on part of 
defense counsel, but it is difficult to see how this 
statement could have assisted the defendant under 
any circumstances. On the other hand, it created 
the risk that the jury would assume the defendant 
had been involved in other sexual offenses on other 
occasions because of his proximity to the scene of 
unrelated crimes. It would appear that this statement 
falls within the same type of conduct by defense 
counsel as mentioned in Point One, United States v. 
Bosch, supra. 
POINT FIVE 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISALLOWING THE 
TESTIMONY OF DAVID DODD. 
The Court refused to allow the proferred expert 
testimony of Dr. David Dodd, a Ph.D. psychologist on 
the many problems and misconceptions involved in 
evaluating the accuracy of eyewitness identifications. 
Dr. Dodd maintained that education, special training, 
and intelligence are not meaningful factors in 
assessing the accuracy of such an identification. 
(T 164) In other words, these factors do not improve 
a person's ability to perceive or recall an incident 
although most laymen, including jurors, erroneously 
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believe the reverse is true. It should be noted 
the complaining witness is a highly educated woman 
with several advanced degrees including'a degree in 
Police Science. Judge John F. Wahlquist, at the 
suppression hearing, made the following Finding of 
Fact: 
"It is necessary to recognize the 
general character of this particular 
crime. This particular crime victim, 
from the standpoint of a prosecuting 
witness, is almost ideal. She has a 
master's degree in a related field 
which would cause her to guard, to be 
careful, and to be alert. She's at 
her prime in life. She appears to be 
in excellent health. Her vision appears 
to be good at short distances. At the 
time of her assault, there were no 
distracting· forces .. such, as other third 
parties. There was some striking, but 
there was no evidence o.f. any 
unconsciousness or anything of the 
sort. There is every reason· to believe 
that this is an above average intelligent 
woman who has been carefully trained by 
the fates of life to be what she is now, 
and that is a crime victim witness:- This 
is her status. The record also shows 
that she has throughout.been considerably 
cautious as far as identification is 
concerned." (Suppression Hearing 41, 42) 
In the recent case, State v. Griffin, No. 
16669, filed February 20, 1981, the Utah Supreme 
Court upheld the trial Court's refusal to allow 
testimony of a psychologist as an expert witness to 
testify about the credibility of eyewitness 
identification. In Griffin,,. this Court indicated 
that the use of expert testimony on the merits· of .. ,:,-
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eyewitness identification was within the discretion 
of the trial court and that expert testimony would 
not ordinarily be allowed in areas equally within 
the knowledge of jurors. 
If Judge Wahlquist believed that education, 
special training, and intelligence enhanced one's 
capacity to perceive and recall, then surely one or 
more jurors could have shared his opinion. The 
purpose of Dr. Dodd's testimony was to rebut what 
the defense maintained was a popularly held 
misconception. The defendant was prejudiced. He 
was denied the opportunity to completely present his 
side of the case. The prosecutor went into great 
detail establishing the educational background, 
special training, and supposed high intelligence of 
the complaining witness. The purpose of this testimony 
was to infer that she possessed a superior ability to 
perceive and accurately recall. Would the prosecutor 
have gone into such detail if the complaining witness 
had been an uneducated fry cook at a local cafe? 
It is submitted that proferred testimony of 
Dr. Dodd was not within the ordinary intelligence of 
the jurors and that the Court abused its discretion 
by not allowing him to testify. Expert opinion 
testimony is admissible if it will aid the jury on a 
factual issue in a case. Expert Testimony on Eyewitness 
Perception, 82 Dick. L. Rev. 465 (1978). 
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While Griffin held that it is within the 
discretion of the trial court to allow•this type of 
expert testimony, it appears that Judge Gould 
erroneously believed he did not have discretion 
since there wasn't a Utah case at that time. (T 170) 
POINT SIX 
THE IDENTIFICATIONS OF DEFENDANT BY THE COMPLAINING 
WITNESS WERE TAINTED AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED. 
On April 17, 1980j the day after the assault, 
the complaining witness was shown a.group of mug shots 
. in a,n attempt to identify her assailant. --··From these 
pictures she picked out four individuals she thought 
resembled him. (Suppression Hearing 9) On July 1, 1980, 
., the c9mplaining :witness was shown seven drivers license 
photos which she mistakenly thought -contained -•the same. 
four pictures a& before which she narrowed down to two 
possible suspects. (Suppression Hearing 10) Then she 
requested a recent photograph of one of these men and 
the next day, .. the police showed ·her a" Mound Fort Junior 
High school yearbook open to a page where the defendant 
was pictured alone with the basketball team. (T 83, 84) 
An identification was obtained. 
On September 9, 1980, the complaining witness 
picked the defendant out of a lineup•at the police 
station. The lineup was conducted in violation of 
State statute. Nevertheless, the earlier photographic 
-19-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
lineups and the in-court identifications were held 
admissible. (Suppression Hearing 42-44) 
Although the evidence is in conflict, it 
appears the first photographic display did not 
contain a picture of the defendant. (T 116) 
Throughout the proceedings, the complaining witness 
maintained that she picked him out from the first 
group of mug shots on April 17, 1980. On the other 
hand, the police officers say that the complaining 
witness was not shown a picture of the defendant 
until two or three months later. (T 118) 
The mug shots cannot be produced because they 
were returned to the Ogden City Police Department 
without a proper record being kept which is prejudicial 
to defendant. (T 118) These pictures would have been 
helpful in supporting defendant's contention of mistaken 
identity. 
In order to encourage the complaining witness 
to make an identification, the police offered certain 
unsolicited comments. While reviewing the second group 
of pictures, she was told none of the men were "nice 
guys". (Suppression Hearing 12, 31) After looking at 
the yearbook photograph, she was informed that 
defendant had committed a sex offense in California. 
(Suppression Hearing 24) These comments by the police 
officer were suggestive, irresponsible, and extremely 
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prejudicial since their purpose was to assure the 
complaining witness that even if she'"tnade a 
misidentification, it would not create too much of 
a miscarriage of justice because the men shown to 
her were social degenerates anyway. 
The yearbook photograph was unduly suggestive 
since defendant was the only adult on the page·;.'· The 
tainted identification process was bolstered by the"'•' 
illegal lineup suppressed by Judge John F. Wahlquist. 
Photographic iineups are to be afforded the 
same due process protection as in-person lineups. 
Simmons v. United States, 390 lY:s. 377 (1968). 
The test is whether the pre-trial confrontation was 
so unnecessarily sugge'stive and conducive to 
irreparable mistaken identification that the 
defendant was denied due process of law. 
Stovall v. Denno, 338 U.S. 293 (1967). 
The in-court identification of defendant by 
the complaining witness was tainted by unconstitutional· 
pre-trial confrontations. In Wong Sun v. United ·· 
States, 371 u.s. 471, the Court said that evidence 
to which an objection is made cannot come from 
exploitation of prior illegality which is not purged 
from the primary taint. Where a flawed pre-trial •· 
iden~ification occurs, the State is not entitled to 
use an in-court identification without showing it is ~ 
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not tainted by the prior identification. Only a 
per se exclusionary rule can be an effective sanction 
to ensure that law enforcement authorities will 
respect the defendant's due process rights during 
pre-trial identification procedures. See Gilbert v. 
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). 
In Neil v. Biggers, 34 L. Ed 2d 401 (1972), 
the United States Supreme Court held that the 
reliability of the identification procedure must 
be considered under the "totality of the circumstances". 
Those circumstances include "the opportunity of the 
witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, 
the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the 
witness' prior description of the criminal, the level 
of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the 
confrontation, and the length of time between the 
crime and the confrontation", at 411. 
Applying each of these factors in defendant's 
case, the evidence is as follows: 
A) Opportunity to view the criminal. 
Mrs. Williams claims the assailant was in front of 
her for 7-1/2 to 8 minutes. (T 72) 
B) Degree of attention. Considering the 
nature of the crime, this aspect could be questionable. 
She claims she observed him closely, but admitted she 
did not observe his eyes. (T 97) 
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C) Accuracy of prior description. 
Mrs. Williams gave an oral description to police 
on the day of the asault as follows: A white male 
American approximately 45 to 50 years old, 
approximately six foot four tall, thin.build, but 
was muscular, had light to medium brown hair that 
was graying, hair was slightly wavy and parted on the 
right side. The male has a ruddy complexion which 
appears to be acne scars. Has a distinctive line or 
scar on the left side of his face. No facial hair. 
Facial features appear square with a medium to large 
nose. No glasses. Suspect was wearing dark navy-blue 
sweater shirt and navy-blue sweat pants. Suspect has 
a slight tan and his skin appears leathery. (T 75) 
She denied at trial that she told police his hair 
was slightly wavy. (T 76) 
The next day she wrote out a description for 
the police as follows: Approximately 45 years old, 
stood about six three or six four, had medium to light 
brown hair with a great deal of gray running through 
it, had straight hair that had body to it, parted on 
the right side, a ruddy complexion with skin that 
was leathery, tawnish, and marked with scars that 
appeared to be the result of bad acne during 
adolescent years, had a line on his face. Appeared 
to be outdoors a lot, lean and in good shape. (T 77) 
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At trial she admitted the defendant had no 
acne scars. (T g2) He had no scar but had lines 
on both sides of his face, not just the left side. ~ 
(T 92) The defendant is only six foot one inch. 
(T 365) In judging his height for police, she had 
compared her assailant to her husband's height which 
is five foot eleven and a half inches. (T 57) If 
that were correct, she shouldn't have been.so far 
off on estimated height. The defendant has never 
had a part in his hair while teaching at Mound Fort. 
(T 318) He has never owned or been seen in a-navy-blue 
sweat shirt or navy-blue sweat pants. (T 345, 309) 
D) Level of certainty of witness. 
Mrs. Williams claimed she was certain in her 
,,identification of the defendant, but she was also 
certain that the defendant's picture was among the 
first group of mug shots shown to·-her on·April 17, 1980, 
and the police admit she is wrong in that regard. 
E) Length of time between crime and 
confrontation; The crime occurred on April 16, 1980. 
Mrs. Williams was first shown a picture of defendant 
on July 1, 1980. The first in-person meeting occurred 
through a one-way glass window at the suppressed lineup 
in September of .. 1980. All subsequent identification 
from that point on were tainted by the prior 
illegalities. 
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It js submitted that the critical factors 
in the totality of circumstances, i.e. the length 
of t'ime before initial identification, the error 
about defendant's mug shot, and mistakes in the 
description, all point to an unreliable 
identification. 
The failure to keep records of the mug shots 
shown to Mrs. Williams on April 17, 1980 was 
extremely damaging to defendarrtr/. 
"In short, the accused's inability 
to effectively reconstruct at trial 
any unfairness that occurred at 
lineup may deprive him of his only 
opportunity meaningfully to attack 
the credibility of the witness' 
courtroom identification." United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
Thus, even if the conduct of the pre-trial identification 
is not so unnecessarily suggestive as to amount to a 
denial of due process, the circumstances of the prior 
identification are recognized by the Supreme Court as 
constituting a potential source of material for 
cross-examination. In this case, all opportunities 
for cross-examination were lost when the photographic 
lineups were not properly preserved. 
Where a law enforcement agency loses evidence 
which may be material to the defendant's. case, the· 
charges should be dismissed; United States v. ~' 
174 F. Supp 877 (1957). United States v. 
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Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F. 2d 563 (2nd 
Cir. 1961), involved missing evidence which might 
have been of value in cross-examining a prosecution 
witness. The potential value of the evidence in 
cross-eximination could not be estimated with 
accuracy the Court reasoned. Therefore, since it 
was apparent that the evidence would have had at 
least some such value, the Court found it to be 
material to the defense and its negligent 
suppression a violation of due process. See also 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) by analogy. 
POINT SEVEN 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE A 
WRITTEN LABORATORY REPORT BY JAMES GASKILL, WEBER 
STATE COLLEGE CRIME LAB DIRECTOR. 
James Gaskill testified about conducting 
certain laboratory tests. The substance of the 
testimony was that the blood type obtained from 
defendant's saliva sample matched the blood type 
in the assailant's semen found on the body of the 
complaining witness. Also, both specimens contained 
the H antigen which shows they are secretors. His 
written report was then offered and admitted into 
evidence. (T 15 0) 
While the testimony only placed the defendant 
within forty to forty-five percent of the world's 
population, (T 146), as an exhbit, the report 
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created a continuing impression on the jury since 
they could review it again and again during their 
deliberations. It was the only physical evidence 
that had any circumstantial connection to the 
defendant, no matter how slight. 
It is clear from Rules 62 and 63 of the Rules 
of Evidence that the. report is hearsay and .does not 
fall within any of the recognized exceptions. 
POINT EIGHT 
THE STATE'S INTENTIONAL REFERENCE TO ALLEGED PRIOR 
CRIMINAL MISCONDUCT BY THE DEFEND~.T AND_ THE -COURT'S 
REFUSAL TO GIVE A CAUTIONARY- INSTRUCTION WAS --
PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
During the cross-examination of the defendant-, 
the prosecutor asked: 
"Do you recall making the statement _,__ 
to them (the police), I'm a voyeur, 
but I wouldn't assault anyone." (T 358) 
This is an impermissible comment on defendant's 
character and was an obvious attempt to let the jury 
know about defendant's past misdemeanor problems which 
were clearly inadmissible.. There .was a timely 
objection and the Court ruled in de£endant's favor, 
but denied the request for a cautionary instruction. 
(T 63) 
In United States v. Diaz, 585 F. 2d 116 
(5th Cir. 1978), the Court said: 
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"The sole issue, therefore, is whether 
the failure of the trial judge in this 
case to give such an instruction, sua 
sponte, is reversible error. It does 
not appear that this precise question 
has been determined by this circuit. 
Other circuits are divided on this. 
See Nutt v. United States, 335 F. 2d 
817 (10th Cir.), a cert. denied 379 
U.S. 909, 85 S. Ct. 203, 13 L. Ed 2d 
180 (1964) , holding that there was no 
error when a limiting instruction was 
not requested; contra, United States v. 
Bobbitt, 146 U.S. App. D.C. 224, 450 
F 2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1971), holding 
that the trial judge must act, sua 
sponte, whether or not a request for 
an instruction is made. United 
States v. Ailstock, 546 F. 2d 1285 
(6th Cir. 1976); Evans v. Cowan, 506 
F. 2d 1248 (6th Cir. 1974)~117. 
They further stated: 
"We recognize the salutary rule that 
empowers the trial judge to exercise 
discretion in determining what curative 
instruction is required and hold only 
that when, during a jury trial, 
evidence is introduced that the 
defendant has a prior conviction for 
the same offense for which he is being 
tried, both counsel and the court have 
a duty to minimize the risk that the 
jury would infer guilt on the cocaine 
charges from the fact of previous 
convictions on cocaine charges. Thus, 
in this situation where no cautionary 
instruction is given to the jury, 
prejudicial error has intervened" at 118. 
POINT NINE 
THE STATE'S USE OF WITNESSES TO REBUT DEFENDANT'S 
ALIBI WITHOUT WRITTEN NOTICE WAS IN VIOLATION OF 
STATUTE. 
In compliance with 77-14-2, Utah Code 
Annotated, defense counsel submitted a list of all 
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but one alibi witness which he decided to call after 
his initial Notice of Alibi had been filed. The 
prosecutor did not provide notice of rebuttal 
witnesses as required by that same statute. Defense 
counsel did not object, but it is cl€ar from the 
record that the State's alibi rebuttal witnesses had «;. 
a devastating effect on defendant's case. 
Most all of the alibi witnesses called by 
defendant claimed to have seen him at Mound Fort 
Junior High school at the time of the alleged attack. 
Each of the witnesses recalled this day because there 
had been a baseball game with another school. They" 
also recalled that there had been a slight rain 
shower sometime during or just prior to the game. 
All of the State's rebuttal witnesses, including 
Mark Eubank, ~laimed there was no rain on that day in 
the area of Mound Fort Junior High. 
In Judge Gould's Memorandum Decision denying 
defendant's motion for a new trial, he claimed that 
:L f this was an error, it was harmless· since defense 
counsel had actual knowledge of these rebuttal 
witnesses well before the trial commenced. There is 
nothing in the record to support this ·conclusion. 
While some of these witnesses were introduced to the 
prospective jury during voir dire, there is nothing 
to indicate they were to be used as rebuttal witnesses 
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or the nature of their testimony. 
POINT TEN 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING HEARSAY TESTIMONY FROM 
STATE'S WITNESS, MARK EUBANK. 
One of the most damaging witnesses to defendant 
was Mark Eubank. He testified about the weather on 
April 16, 1980. The entire presentation was hearsay. 
None of the people he claimed observed the weather 
testified in court. Meaningful cross-examination 
and confrontation was impossible. Even though an 
objection was not taken, the Court should have alerted 
defendant's counsel at a bench conference or entered 
an objection on its own. To illustrate this point, 
it should be noted that on another occasion the 
Court entered its own objection to a leading question 
posed by defense counsel without prior objection by the 
State. (T 234) The Court should have afforded the same 
courtesy to the defendant in this damaging area of 
testimony. 
In his Memorandum Decision denying defendant's 
motion for new trial, Judge Gould stated that 
Mark Eubank's testimony was founded upon regular 
entires made in the course of business known as 
"Weather Bank" and, therefore, admissible as an 
exception to the hearsay rule. 
Rule 63(13), Utah Rules of Evidence, states: 
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"Writings offered as memoranda or 
records of acts, conditions or events 
to prove the facts stated therein, if 
the judge finds that they were made 
in the regular course of a business 
at or about the time of the act, 
condition or event recorded, and that 
the sources of information from which 
made and the method and circumstances 
of their preparation were such as to 
indicate their trustworthiness." 
The substance of Mark Eubank's testimony came 
from documents of weather conditions that were 
prepared by other weather observers, not a part 
of "Weather Bank", and sent to Mr. Eubank for his 
own information. Those documents were not made in 
the regular course of his business. 
Even if Mr. Eubank's testimony could have 
fallen within the exception stated above, there was 
absolutely no foundation to show that the exception, 
in fact, applied. 
POINT ELEVEN 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT OCCURRED IN TESTIMONY OF 
FLORENCE STOWE WHEN CALLED AS A REBUTTAL WITNESS 
BY THE STATE. 
Florence Stowe was initially called by the 
defendant. She testified that defendant was at work 
at Mound Fort Junior High school on April 16, 1980 
and that she could remember the day because she had 
ordered some cream pies for a church meeting that 
night and recorded this fact in a personal journal. 
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The prosecutor recalled Mrs. Stowe in rebuttal and 
asked her to read the dates of the last two entries 
in her journal which were March 30, 1980 and 
April 26, 1980. The prosecutor asked no further 
questions and created the impression for the jury 
that Mrs. Stowe was mistaken about the date in her 
earlier testimony. Defense counsel also failed to 
ask any further questions. 
Mrs. Stowe's Affidavit was filed with the 
Court during the hearing on defendant's motion for 
new trial. (R 641) Her journal entry on 
April 26, 1980 specifically referred to the date of 
the church function as April 16, 1980. Mrs. Stowe's 
Affidavit further states that the Weber County 
Attorney's office had previously confirmed that the 
church meeting in question was in fact held on 
April 16, 1980. 
In Walker v. State, 624 P. 2d 687 (1981), 
the Utah Supreme Court· held that a false impression 
knowingly fostered by the prosecutor could have 
affected the judgment of the jury and the 
prosecutorial misconduct deprived the defendant of 
a fair trial. 
It is submitted that this prosecutor also 
intentionally created a false impression in the minds 
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of the jury and thereby deprived defendant of 
a fair trial. 
POINT TWELVE 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY. 
The errors referred to in this Point were 
not preserved by defense counsel at trial. Rule 
19(c) of Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states 
that, not withstanding a parties failure to object, 
error may be assigned to instructions in order to 
avoid manifest injustice. 
In United States v. Greene, 59~ F. 2d 471 
(8th Cir. 1979) ,. the Court held that where eyewitness 
·identification was the sole basis for conviction, it 
was reversible error for the trial court not to give 
a cautionary instruction alerting the jury to the 
inherent frailties of eyewitness identification. 
The language of this instruction was first 
drafted by the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia in United States v. Telfaire,,c469 F. 2d 552 
at 558-559 (1972). It was restated in Greene as 
follows: 
"Identification testimony is an 
expression of belief or impression 
by the witness. In this .. case its 
value depends on the opportunity 
the witness had to observe whether 
or not the. defendant was the person 
on Trans World Airlines Flight 245 
and in Los Angeles and to make a 
reliable identification later. 
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In appraising the identification 
testimony of a witness, you should 
consider the following: 
1) Are you convinced that the 
witness had the capacity and an 
adequate opportunity to observe 
the of fender? 
Whether the witness had an adequate 
opportunity to observe the person 
at the time will be affected by such 
matters as how long or short a time 
was available, how far or close the 
witness was, how good were lighting 
conditions, whether the witness had 
had occasion to see or know the 
person in the past. 
2) Are you satisfied that the 
identification made by the witness 
subsequent to the event was the 
product of his or her own 
recollection? 
You may take into account both the 
strength of the identification, and 
the circumstances under which the 
identification was made. If the 
identification by the witness may 
have been influenced by the 
circumstances under which the 
defendant was presented to him for 
identification, you should scrutinize 
the identification with great care. 
You may also consider the length of 
time that lapsed between the occurrence 
of the crime and the next opportunity 
of the witness to see defendant, as a 
factor bearing on the reliability of 
the identification. 
3) Finally, you must consider the 
credibility of each identification 
witness in the same way as any other 
witness, consider whether he is 
truthful, and consider whether he 
had the capacity and opportunity to 
make a reliable observation on the 
matter covered in his testimony. 
I again emphasize that the burden of 
proof on the prosecutor extends to 
every element of the crime charged, 
and this specifically includes the 
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burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt the identity of the defendant 
as being the person on Trans World 
Airlines Flight 245 and being in 
Los Angeles. If after examining the 
testimony, you have a reasonable 
doubt to the accuracy of the 
identification, you must find in 
favor of the defendant on this issue'~ 
at 474, footnote 4. 
The instruction has subsequently been approved 
in United States v. Holley, 502 F. 2d 273 (4th Cir. 
1974) and United States v. Hodges, 515 F. 2d 650 
(7th Cir. 1975). State courts have also approved 
the instruction in principle or slightly altered 
form. Brook v. State, 380 So. 2d 1012 at 1014 
(Ala. 1980) Freeman v. State, 371 So. 2d 118 
(Fla. 1979) Corrunonwealth v. Rodriguez, 391 N.E. 
2d 892 (Mass. 1979); and in a concurring opinion 
in Hampton v. State, 285 N.W. 2d 868 at 875 (Wis. 1979). 
Since the sole basis for conviction of this 
defendant rested upon questionable identification 
procedures previously explained, it was imperative 
to give the Telfaire charge. 
Other states which have considered the 
instruction but refused to require it have said the 
essence of the instruction was given in other 
instructions of the Court, particularly the 
instruction on credibility of witnesses. 
This standard cannot be· applied in defendant's 
-35-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
case. Judge Gould read the first eleven instructions 
to the jury at the start of the trial, but did not 
reread them at the conclusion of the three-day trial. 
These preliminary instructions included the instructions 
on presumption of innocence and on judging the 
credibility of witnesses. 
This practice prejudiced the defendant because 
important instructions were not given to the jury at 
the close of the case and, therefore, not fresh in 
their minds. 
POINT THIRTEEN 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WAS FURTHER 
DEMONSTRATED BY FAILING TO ATTEMPT INTRODUCTION 
OF DEFENDANT'S POLYGRAPH RESULT.S. 
The defendant passed a polygraph test administered 
by Dr. David Raskin. Admittedly, he had failed a 
polygraph earlier administered by police under 
questionable circumstances. (Suppression Hearing 43) 
Defense counsel made no attempt at trial to have the 
results admitted despite Dr. Raskin's previously 
recognized qualifications. State v. Collins, 612 
P. 2d 775, 778 (1980). 
In Collins, this Court stated that it would 
consider the admissibility of an unstipulated 
polygraph provided it had the benefit of an adequate 
evidentiary record, at 778. Qualified defense counsel 
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should have been aware of the foundational 
requirements cited in Collins and made the 
appropriate attempt at trial. 
CONCLUSION 
A motion for new trial as provided for in 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires 
only a showing of error or improprieties which had 
a substantial adverse effect on the defendant. Any 
of these points may well have satisfied that burden. 
The accumulated effect is overwhelming. 
DATED this 13th day of May, 1981. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRIAN R. FLORENCE 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
818-26th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
1, HN BLAIR HUTCHISON 
/ ttorney for Defendant-Appellant 
818-26th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
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